Can we measure memes? by McNamara, A
EVOLUTIONARY NEUROSCIENCE
already been done within experimental protocols in a number of 
fields (see Do We Measure Memes Already?). Modern neuroimag-
ing techniques enable us to quantify changes in neural-network-
functional-connectivity-profiles as we perceive, learn, memorize, 
imitate, or perhaps more accurately “replicate” memes.
THE NEAT VIEW OF GENES
According to popular imagination, genes fit nicely into the physical 
world view that we can imagine even if not see. They are encoded 
using a four letter alphabet, lie in long lines and one can imag-
ine reading them in a sensible manner. They are easily defined 
and their function is delineated. Unfortunately for geneticists the 
truth is not as simple as the popular imagination would have one 
believe. Defining a gene/cistron is no easy task – let alone identify-
ing a gene’s impact on an organism’s internal functions. Admittedly 
there are “start” and “end” coding sequences to a gene, but not all 
the sequence between these markers are read, non-coding intron 
sequences are scattered across the gene (Gilbert, 1978). Genes can 
overlap on the chromosome (Normark et al., 1983; Veeramachaneni 
et al., 2004; Sanna et al., 2008), differing genes can be coded upon 
the same strand, or not, within the same frame, or not. Overlap can 
affect regulation of gene expression at the level of transcription, 
mRNA processing, splicing, or translation (Boi et al., 2004). Introns 
often also lead to alternative RNA splicing making genes difficult 
to define by creating alternative pathways for protein expression 
(Berget et al., 1977; Breathnach et al., 1977). Alternative splicing 
can account for massive consequences on function (Cavara and 
Hollmann, 2008) and is crucial to many genes involved in gen-
erating immunity (Lynch, 2004). Taking into account the cellular 
environment, functionality of the “start,” “end,” “enhancing,” and 
“silencing” sequences is entirely dependent upon other factors. 
The end product of genes is of course proteins, of which many of 
these protein’s function is ultimately defined by its molecular envi-
ronment. The action of a gene becomes far less clearly delineated 
when one moves away from the common man’s overly deterministic 
INTRODUCTION
MEMES, MIRROR NEURONS, AND MODERN NEUROIMAGING
It has been suggested that the sudden explosion of what is con-
sidered fundamentally human: consciousness, culture, language, 
and intellect is a consequence of our evolved capacity to imitate 
(Donald, 1993). That the driving force for this cultural explosion 
was the generation of a second environ-mental space in which 
memes drove biological selection as well as genes (Blackmore, 
1999). A meme is a replicator, a cultural unit operating under 
Darwinian evolutionary principles analogous to a gene, but a 
distinct replicator in its own right (Dawkins, 1976; Goodenough 
and Dawkins, 1994). A meme in layman terms is a concept or 
idea, embodied by a word, a phrase, a riff, image, or gesture. A 
meme “exists” in the world of ideas and replicates by imitation. 
Memes are fluffy, non-delineated concepts rendering them some-
what untouchable by cognitive neuroscience albeit that they share 
considerable functional overlap with a seminal discovery in neu-
roscience. Over a decade ago mirror neurons, encoding the inten-
tion of “others,” were discovered (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti 
et al., 1996). It was quickly proposed that these neurons, located 
in regions highly involved in imitation, were the neural substrates 
upon which language could have evolved (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 
1998). The biological observation of neurons facilitating action 
recognition and replication fully supported a theory of memetics 
(Blackmore, 2005) and the field of memetics has grown (Heylighen 
and Chielens, 2008). However cognitive neuroscience has given 
the idea a fairly wide birth, probably due to the aforementioned 
non-measurable, indefinable nature of memes. This paper briefly 
reviews the biologically based work on the evolution of language. 
The paper concludes cognitive neuroscience can, and should, apply 
considerable weight to the investigation of memetics. Firstly, the 
paper suggests that although memes may not be quantifiable, the 
traces of the neural processes involved in memetic replication and 
storage within the central nervous system (CNS) are measurable. 
Producing artificial memes for study is easily achieved and has 
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 concept of a gene and faces the real complexity that geneticists have 
to disentangle. It is estimated that we have identified less than 0.3% 
of all 650,000 estimated protein interactions among the ∼25,000 
human proteins (Stumpf et al., 2008). Genes replicate in the physi-
cal world and we can measure them. However, we began to measure 
genes via their phenotypes long before identifying where, and on 
which chromosome they resided. Genetics was born from the pains-
taking and careful observation of clear, single gene phenotypes in 
pea plant petal color (Mendel, 1951). In reality how a gene fits into 
the organization of an organism is not as clear as one may imagine, 
how a gene impacts on cellular events and ultimately an organism’s 
phenotype is only, in very rare cases, fully known. Mendel did not 
discover the fundamentals of genetics by throwing his hands in the 
air and exclaiming that it was all too complex and immeasurable. It 
appears that this is the current scientific stance on memes.
REPLICATION OF BEHAVIOR FROM A COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVE
In the field of cognitive neuroscience imitation is recognized as 
a fundamental human skill (Arbib, 2005; Roth and Dicke, 2005; 
Iriki, 2006). Neurons have been identified which match action 
perception with action execution, as well as action recognition 
in the monkey (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). 
These neurons, coined “mirror neurons,” were found in the ventral-
pre-motor region F5 and parietal region F7 and have since been 
intensively studied (Kohler et al., 2002; Raos et al., 2004, 2006; 
Ferrari et al., 2005). It appears that monkeys infer the “intention” 
of others’ actions within their own motor systems (Umiltà et al., 
2001). Significantly, the motor system ceased to be a region consid-
ered to have low level function somewhat like the strings of a pup-
peteer. It became recognized the motor system had an important 
role in the evolution of communicative skills and understanding. 
Human homologs to these regions have been proposed based on a 
body of converging evidence (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Binkofski 
and Buccino, 2006). There is little contesting the idea that ventral-
pre-motor area Brodmann Area 44 (BA44) is the human homolog 
to monkey region F5 and that the infero-parietal lobule constitutes 
the human homolog to monkey region F7. This fronto-parietal net-
work has been demonstrated as involved in complex hand gestures 
and movements (Binkofski et al., 1999a,b). Left BA44 incorpo-
rates the region commonly known as Broca’s language area (Mohr, 
1976). Experimental work demonstrates that humans activate their 
own appropriate motor regions at a sub-threshold level when they 
observe actions or hear words pertaining to actions (Fadiga et al., 
2002; Fadiga and Craighero, 2004). It has been said that the human 
motor system resonates with observed external cues, with sub-
threshold activity in one’s own motor system when viewing actions 
of another (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Etzel et al., 2008). The 
mirror neuron system (MNS) appears to be the biological motor 
component permitting “the first transition,” one of acquiring 
“mimetic skill” required for the evolution of culture and cogni-
tion (Donald, 1993). Indeed, shortly after the initial experiments 
this claim was made in the seminal paper by Rizzolatti and Arbib 
(1998). The impact of the discovery of mirror neurons has been 
enormous, leading to a large debate with regard to social cognition 
as a whole (Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Gallese, 2007). Not least, it 
gave rise to studies to uncover the possible genetic changes that 
permitted this evolutionary leap (Corballis, 2004; Feuk et al., 2006), 
new means to interpret clinical disorders (Williams et al., 2001; 
Iacoboni and Mazziotta, 2007) and development of novel rehabili-
tation approaches for brain injury (Ertelt et al., 2007).
REPLICATION OF BEHAVIOR FROM A MEMETIC PERSPECTIVE
The term meme was first coined by Dawkins to describe cul-
tural replicators and he described what have since become well 
worn examples, irritating pop tunes and ad jingles as replica-
tors (Dawkins, 1976). Dawkins argued three pre-requisites for 
Darwinian evolution to occur, replication, variance, and selection 
and used the meme as an exemplifier that genes are not the “be 
all and end all” of evolution. Blackmore took the meme concept 
and expanded upon it. Suggesting memes as the second evolution-
ary force upon humans, specifically for the massive increase in 
brain size, drive for language acquisition, and culture as a whole 
(Blackmore, 1999). She argues that when humans acquired a key 
ability for imitation selective pressure occurred for those who could 
imitate best and thus most quickly acquire skills. Demonstrations 
of imitative ability would be in adornment, dance, song, and music, 
as well as in performance via hunting and gathering abilities. In her 
book, Blackmore argues that imitating gestures for communication 
would progress to more effective vocalizations for communica-
tion and that this would have led to language. Suddenly a new 
environment for replication emerged within the cognitive space of 
human brain activity and the physical world within which humans 
were able to interact. This process, was startlingly similar to that 
referred to as “mimesis” by Donald (1993) almost a decade earlier. 
Yet Donald did not focus on the evolutionary nature of memes, 
but on human capacities affected by “genetic” evolution. Memes, 
reproduce, have variance and undergo selection in a competitive 
environment (Cardoso and Atwell, 2010) and hence have all three 
pre-requisites (replication, variance, and selection) to a Darwinian 
evolutionary system. Consequently, memetic evolution constitutes 
a second evolutionary force affecting human development. These 
are very powerful claims and are confronted by a variety of objec-
tions (Boyd and Richardson, 2000; Dugatkin, 2000; Sperber, 2000) 
and with notable silence in the most pertinent area of current cog-
nitive neuroscience research, the MNS (Iacoboni, 2005; Rizzolatti, 
2005). The main reason, and perhaps a very good reason, for the 
reticence of neuroscience to join this debate is the lack of a working 
definition for a meme and its apparent impossibility to measure.
However, the point of interaction between the meme rich envi-
ronment that we live in and our biological mass, or body, is of 
course the brain and therefore very much the stuff of cognitive 
neuroscience. Memes are proposed as being the primary driving 
force for the development of human intellect, and indirectly brain 
size after the key acquisition of imitative skills. Sometime between 
the appearance of the first stone tools created by Homo habilis (2.5 
million years ago) and the arrival of Homo erectus (1.5 million 
years ago) our ancestors developed a considerably larger brain and 
more advanced mimetic culture (Donald, 1993). It is claimed that 
imitation conferred considerable advantage to imitators as they 
rapidly learned skills (fire making, hunting tactics) from others, 
circumventing less efficient trial and error approaches. Computer 
simulation of such a novel imitative phenotype moving within 
a population predicts logarithmic increases in learning ability, 
logarithmic increases in number of memes (imitated actions) per 
individual, and logarithmic increases in mean fitness (Higgs, 2000). 
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category, i.e., “if God then omnipotent,” “if God then good,” “if 
God punish bad.” Sets of mutually reinforcing linked production 
rules (memes) could be combined to produce inferences and this 
set of rules would constitute a memeplex (for full explanation see, 
Heylighen and Chielens, 2008).
A BREAKDOWN OF THE MEME IN BIOLOGICAL TERMS AND A WORKING 
HYPOTHESIS
There are two types of questions above, first those that pertain to the 
internal transmission/storage of memes, within our CNS, and those 
that pertain to the external transmission/storage of memes in the 
world. These are consequently referred to as i-memes and e-memes 
respectively. Delineating e-memes may be relatively easy, even as they 
appear as conglomerate masses of many memes interwoven together. 
Humans go to considerable lengths to ensure the best fidelity of 
e-memes. This may be the reason behind copyright law, technological 
endeavors to ever increased fidelity of media reproduction, and the 
huge quantities of finance poured into the marketing and public rela-
tions branches of companies and political parties. It is via the media 
that the ever growing amount of memetic transmission occurs. The 
i-meme is of greater consequence however to cognitive neurosci-
ence. The i-meme and e-meme are identical to that referred to as 
the memotype and mediotype by Heylighen and Chielens (2008).
Before presenting a working hypothesis however, it should be 
stated that the general point of this paper does not stand or fall 
on the issues of what constitutes an i-meme. Rather on whether 
changes to an i-meme can be measured directly by measuring 
changes in the connectivity profiles of brain regions as a result of 
changes to e-memes.
The i-meme constitutes the full set of “meme-specific” neural 
connections enabling e-memes to be perceived and transmitted by 
a communicative motor action in any one of its forms (verbal or 
gestural). Fundamentally, this neural network must incorporate the 
pre-requisite communicative motor component. Susan Blackmore 
states that memes are not perceptual experiences. The definition for 
the i-meme does not contradict this albeit let it be stressed that all 
i-memes will include (direct and/or indirect) connectivity between 
perceptual related brain regions and motor related brain regions. 
The i-meme is not “just” the neural substrates of perceptual experi-
ences of an e-meme, it is the neural substrate of e-meme perception 
“linked to” the neural substrate of communicative motor act(s) 
required to reproduce that e-meme. The same could be said about 
emotional experiences. An i-meme cannot be solely an emotional 
experience yet an i-meme may contain an emotional component.
The primary components of the i-memes are envisaged as cor-
tical and limbic. The pre-requisite motor component proposed 
is most likely to reside within the MNS. Previous studies demon-
strate BA44 acts as a hub for initial integration of the multimodal 
aspects of new stimuli (Baumgaertner et al., 2007; Lahav et al., 
2007; McNamara et al., 2008), essentially binding all aspects of 
an e-meme to the movement that signs for that meme (Figure 1).
Until proven otherwise one must include processes such as 
working memory, basal ganglia mediated learning, and other gen-
eral cognitive processes into the neural network of an i-meme. 
It may well be that the regions underlying these processes are 
non-specifically recruited, but the experiments have not yet 
been conducted to eliminate these general brain functions from 
being included into a working definition of a meme. The basal 
This occurred independent of whether the behavior imitated was 
selected for its negative or positive effect. In other words, imitation 
as a novel strategy for learning predicts logarithmic increases in 
population fitness, independent of how well/badly judged its imple-
mentation by the newly endowed recipient of the skill. Moreover, 
this logarithmic change in evolution occurs, even when consid-
erable negative consequences on fitness are considered, such as 
increased difficulties with childbirth due to increasing head size.
WHAT EXACTLY IS A MEME?
MEMES IN LAYMAN TERMS AND WITHIN THE FIELD OF MEMETICS
Memes are replicants with the three pre-requisite properties for 
producing an evolutionary system, replication, variance, and selec-
tion. Memes replicate within the environment of human behav-
ior (now technologically assisted) using human imitative behavior 
as their method for replication. To replicate, memes must pass 
through four key stages, assimilation (multimodal perception by 
an individual), retention (within memory), expression (by some 
motoric act, speech, or gesture, which can be perceived by others), 
and transmission (to another individual; Heylighen and Chielens, 
2008). These terms are borrowed from genetics and are not alto-
gether concordant with cognitive science’s delineation of cognitive 
processes as will be discussed later. Memes have enormous vari-
ance made self evident by the heterogeneous cultural landscape 
observed across humanity. There is also considerable selection: a 
concept, language, or entire way of life that was here today can be 
gone tomorrow. According to Blackmore, a meme is not an innate 
behavior, conditioned response, emotion, or subjective experience. 
A meme is a behavior or set of behaviors (memeplex) which is learnt 
by observation and imitation. An individual word is a meme, as is 
a musical riff, a dance move, or a meaningful gesture. Religions, 
ideologies, and wider concepts, including the concept of the self, 
are proposed as “memeplexes” or groups of memes analogous to an 
organism (sets of genes replicate as single organisms, sets of memes 
may replicate as memeplexes). A meme is not how you feel when 
you dance or the innate pull toward your partner’s lips, nor, accord-
ing to Blackmore, the perceptual experience of seeing, smelling, or 
touching. This paper proposes a small change to these definitions.
The most common question regarding memes is, “what is a 
meme?” If an individual word is a meme, say for instance the word 
“chair” what in the world constitutes the “chair” meme? Does it 
include the neural substrates for perceiving a chair? Recognizing a 
chair? Knowing what to do with the chair? The neural substrates 
enabling one to pronounce the word chair? The neural substrates 
linked to your sense of current need for a chair? The neural sub-
strates involved in understanding chair as component of the “seat” 
meme? The neural substrates linking a particular chair to a par-
ticularly nightmarish or orgasmic past experience? Is the actual 
chair itself a meme? Are the sound waves created by utterance of 
the word “chair” a meme? Is the image of a chair a meme? Is the 
written word “chair” a meme? When does the meme for “chair” 
become the meme for “seat?”
This paper attempts to offer a description of a meme in terms 
of biology, specifically neural connectivity profiles, but would be 
lacking without describing the memetic unit as currently described 
in information processing terms. The memetic unit has previously 
been usefully defined as a production rule with the form “if condi-
tion, then action” with actions leading to another condition or 
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hardwired behaviors, they must initially be learned. Therefore, 
the i-meme replication machinery (the brain) must be able to 
rapidly link varied signals from any number of sensory modalities, 
internal states, and perhaps prior knowledge of similar concepts 
to the CMO (Figure 1). Economy and efficiency are fundamental 
principles of biology (Blake, 1992) and neural computation (Niven 
et al., 2007) with structure and function inextricably linked. The 
pre-requisite function of the replication system is the initial link-
age of variable aspects of a concept. The pre-requisite structural 
component of an i-meme network is the brain region mediating 
the CMO. The most efficient means to integrate network-structure 
and function would be by co-localization of the two, i.e., an ana-
tomical hub for integration of multimodal integration with the 
CMO. Human primary effectors, the hands and mouth produce 
the CMO and the neural circuits for complex hand and mouth 
actions are housed in the ventral-pre-motor cortex (Binkofski 
et al., 1999a,b). Therefore this brain region, one would deduce, 
would be the locus for mediating initial learning of novel i-memes. 
This region, also known as BA44, incorporating the speech center 
Broca’s Areas is considered the human homolog to monkey region 
F5 and a key site of the MNS.
CAN NEUROIMAGERS MEASURE MEMES?
CONNECTIVITY ANALYSIS OF fMRI DATA
Fascinating studies examining differing cognitive processes between 
cultures already demonstrate how language and culture may shape 
cognition as a whole (for review see Han and Northoff, 2008). For 
example, absolute and relative judgments, (either ignoring or taking 
 ganglia for example may provide controlled movement execution 
and behavioral reinforcement learning (Yelnik, 2008) across all 
i-memes.
One question above not answered by the i-meme/e-meme split is, 
where does the meme for “chair” become the meme for “seat?” The 
i-meme for these two concepts will have considerable functional and 
anatomical overlap, with shared neurons encoding the concept, yet 
the weights of the associations between connected neurons will be 
distinctly different. In this respect, they are specific. The anatomical 
localization for neural correlates of an i-meme is variable, func-
tion dependent, and context specific. The majority of memes would 
presumably not have specific-coding regions within primary visual 
cortex, but perhaps the meme known as “zebra” does1.
PRE-REQUISITES FOR MEMES
Inherent requirements for function are useful delineators when 
mapping an evolutionary system. Memes evolve within the imita-
tion capacity of the biological organism, primarily humans. The 
i-meme must be able to elicit behavior (expression) from its host 
which enables its transmission to other hosts. Therefore, to rep-
licate, an i-meme must inherently have a communicative motor 
output (CMO). Every concept must inherently have a motor com-
ponent, because to communicate (transmit), whether by speech, 
sign, or facial expression we must move our muscles (Donald, 2005; 
McNamara et al., 2008). Secondly, i-memes/concepts are not innate 
FIGURE 1 | An i-meme (internal representation of a meme) comprises the 
neural network which encodes it. (A) Basic structural components of 
non-requisite neural substrate architecture are auditory, vision, touch, proprio-
sensory, taste, olfaction, and internal states (limbic). Communicative motor output 
is the neural substrate for the motor action required to communicate the meme 
and is the only pre-requisite component for a meme. All other components do not 
inherently require a representation within their domain. The basal ganglia (motor 
execution) and working memory are example processes unlikely to be part of an 
i-meme but to act upon them. (B–F) Possible neural substrate architectures for 
some exemplar i-memes, doorbell, ammonia, the irritating sound a personal 
computer makes when encountering an error, the gesture for victory. For 
simplicity, working memory and basal ganglia components are not incorporated.
1Primary visual cortex is particularly sensitive to basic visual stimuli such as black 
and white stripes.
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in  creating  artificial memes and measured the brain activity of that 
process. A PPI analysis (Friston et al., 1993) allowed functional 
connectivity profiles during learning of a novel meme to be meas-
ured. PPI essentially identifies brain regions which demonstrate 
an interaction between the BOLD activity over time from a seed 
region in the brain and a psychological variable, such as improved 
learning. The seed region is often localized by a standard univariate 
general linear model (GLM) analysis of the fMRI data or by a strong 
anatomical hypothesis. The two original variables (the time course 
and learning curve) are entered into a secondary univariate GLM 
analysis along with the interaction term. The output shows to what 
degree the data at each locus in the brain fits the model of increas-
ing (or decreasing) connectivity between regions with increased 
learning. This approach does not allow for a de facto statement of 
directionality and only describes a functional connection, not an 
effective connection.
In the study, novel sounds were associated with novel gestures 
by viewing videos and having participants imitate the novel ges-
ture. The participant’s task was to learn the abstract sound–action 
association. These associations are akin to forming novel memes 
in that they create a concept (sound) which is assimilated into a 
gesture. The assimilation of the motor component is critical as 
otherwise the experiment is a pure associative learning experiment. 
The addition of requiring participants to imitate and generate a 
motor component transforms the stimuli into a concept that can 
be communicated, i.e., a meme. This creation of a simple, novel, 
abstract association which was assimilated into the motor cortex 
allowed for tracking of changes in neural activity and connectivity 
profiles between brain regions as learning and reproduction of an 
artificial meme was undertaken. Parametric decreases in activity 
were observed as a function of learning along with concomitant 
increases in functional connectivity (using PPI analysis) between 
many of these regions. Connectivity was observed between areas 
of the MNS and visual regions, between MNS and tonal processing 
regions, and MNS and working memory regions. Activity was also 
observed in regions involved in standard associative learning such 
as the hippocampus and caudate.
In summary, connectivity analyses tests whether there is any 
evidence to suggest regions showing activity during a task are 
interacting together as a network and crucially allows research-
ers to identify changes in these interactions over time. Even if the 
proposed definition of an i-meme is incorrect then it can still be 
asserted that the technology is available to measure the dynam-
ics of i-memes as they evolve. Finally, even greater opportunity is 
now presented with the development of hyperscanning techniques 
(Montague et al., 2002). Hyperscanning is the running of two MRI 
machines with time-locked data acquisition and real time video 
link between the two participants. Using communicative paradigms 
future studies can measure correlations between two individual’s 
brain activity during the process of meme transmission. Given 
such experimental protocols it may be found that a framework for 
understanding how ideas are transmitted and evolve between two 
people may become very useful.
Natural memes are highly complex, artificial memes are as com-
plex as we choose to engineer them to be. In this sense, memes can 
be viewed as extremely compliant to experimental manipulation. 
As already demonstrated, there are sufficient neuroimaging meth-
ods for systematically exploring the processing and evolution of 
into account context) in even a simple visual experiment showed 
strong effects of culturalization (Heddon et al., 2008). Such studies 
do not allow us to measure memes but provide a valuable resource 
for future experimental design.
To observe individual i-memes, we must measure brain activ-
ity changes over time in multiple regions of the brain simultane-
ously. Brain imaging technology, specifically functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), has now advanced sufficiently for this 
to be achieved (Rogers et al., 2007; Guye et al., 2008; Rykhlevskaia 
et al., 2008). fMRI data allows quantification of the connectivity 
between different regions of the brain. Producing such profiles 
and observing changes in these profiles may be used to describe 
memetic processing at each stage of meme replication. A number 
of statistical approaches for assessing connectivity are now avail-
able for fMRI data of which any could theoretically be applied to 
studying memes. These include Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
(Biswal et al., 1995), psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis 
(Friston et al., 1997), independent component analysis (McKeown 
et al., 1998), structural equation modeling (Gonzalez-Lima and 
McIntosh, 1994; McIntosh, 1998), dynamic causal modeling 
(Friston et al., 1993), Granger causality mapping (Goebel et al., 
2003; Sato et al., 2006), and partial directed coherence (Baccalá 
and Sameshima, 2001; Sato et al., 2009).
Experiments observing the brain connectivity profile dynam-
ics of i-memes as they are learnt and modulated over time can be 
envisaged. Such experiments would allow us to specifically describe 
where network activity changes as “meaning” of a concept changes. 
If a region changes activity as a consequence of changes in “mean-
ing” of a meme then it is a component of the i-meme. If for exam-
ple, basal ganglia can be shown to be only required for facilitating 
learning of memes in general, but not later recognition of memes 
then it can be excised as a component of memes. If memory sys-
tems can be shown to change connectivity profiles in relation to 
demands on memory and not to change as meanings change then 
memory components can be excised as a component of the working 
definition of an i-meme.
DO WE MEASURE MEMES ALREADY?
Many studies may already have unconsciously implemented indi-
vidual i-meme formation as part of their study design. Gautier 
and Tarr (1997) trained subjects to become experts in identifying 
“greebles.” Greebles are nonsense objects which could be classified 
first into families and then identified as individual greebles as a 
participant becomes more expert in identifying salient features. This 
study however did not measure during the learning stages of i-meme 
creation and did not assess the neural dynamics of what had been 
learnt. Koenig et al. (2005) measured brain activity as participants 
first learnt classification of novel animals named “crutters” using 
either rule based or similarity based strategy. This study did col-
lect data during learning but did not assess neural dynamics. Deng 
et al. (2008) compared changes between “pre and post”  learning 
of the semantic meaning associated with Chinese characters over 
time. All these studies and many other well conducted studies can 
be interpreted as studies in i-meme formation. Unfortunately they 
lack connectivity analysis which allows us to view the dynamics 
of memes. In the study conducted by McNamara et al. (2008) the 
dynamics of learning abstract, novel, sound–action associations 
was examined. The study was specifically designed as an exercise 
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